What is at the heart of conflict over abortion? In his celebrated contribution to the topic, Ronald Dworkin argued that disputants in the abortion debate are in fact deeply mistaken about the true terms of their disagreement. Rather than turning on the perennial question of whether or not the fetus is a person, Dworkin claimed that abortion argument is, at bottom, an argument about the intrinsic value of all human life and how it is best respected. More than twenty years after Dworkin put forward his novel thesis, this article reassesses his key claims about the nub of abortion argument, partly in light of subsequent developments in the public abortion conflict. Against Dworkin's revisionist account of the abortion problem, I set out to show that his arguments did not successfully displace the primacy of the personhood question in moral and legal constitutional reasoning about abortion. Nor do they convincingly establish that prenatal personhood is not what contestants in the abortion debate are really arguing about.
for abortion, and is even rendered redundant by other philosophical considerations, some of which have clear legal analogues.
Speaking plainly, there is more than one way of telling someone that she is asking the wrong question about a contentious subject matter. On the one hand, one could say that her question misfires because the answer to that question will not, in the end, determine anything critical in the discussion, and then go on to illustrate why this is so. On the other hand, one might claim that there is something inherently defective about the question itself -that it asks something that cannot be answered; that it is irrational or unintelligible; that it is not pertinent to the topic under consideration, or that it is not what disputants are truly arguing about.
Challenges of both kinds are represented by arguments in abortion debate which seek, in one way or another, to side-line or bypass the personhood question. But challenges of the first kind are, I think, more ubiquitous. Take the following claim, which we can call the 'Good Samaritan Thesis':
The Good Samaritan Thesis: Abortion is morally permissible in all (or almost all) cases, whether or not the fetus is a person, because gestation is a form of Good Samaritanism -that is, it is a form of supererogatory assistance that no one person could be morally obligated to perform in order to preserve the life of another. Consequently, abortion does not kill the fetus, but only discontinues non-obligatory, life-preserving assistance.
The Good Samaritan Thesis (GST) claims that abortion is always or almost always permissible, whether the human fetus is a person or not. In effect, it bypasses the personhood question by stating that it is never, or hardly ever, morally obligatory for a woman to carry a pregnancy to term, even to save the life of another person.
The most well-known iteration of the Good Samaritan Thesis comes in the way of an analogy drawn by Judith Thomson between pregnancy and a hypothetical situation in which a person is kidnapped by a musical society and forcibly connected to a famous, ailing violinist, whose unique kidney condition means that he needs to be connected to that person's body for the next nine months in order to survive. 1
Another personhood-bypassing challenge of the same genus is what we might call The Justified Homicide Thesis, which claims the following:
The Justified Homicide Thesis: Abortion is morally permissible in all (or almost all) cases, whether or not the fetus is a person, because it is a recognisable instance of justifiably killing another person.
The Justified Homicide Thesis (JHT) begins by pointing out that our moral and legal principles make exceptions to the general prohibition on killing other persons, for instance in situations of self defence or absolute necessity, where killing one 4 person, perhaps, one who is doomed imminently to die anyway, is the only way of saving more endangered human life. 2 It then claims that if the fetus were a person, abortion would often or always fit those exceptions. JHT differs meaningfully from the GST in analysing abortion as an act of killing, not just the refusal to save.
Hence, the two theses construct abortion's permissibility in different ways. On JHT, abortion is an example of justified killing, and on GST, of a justified refusal to save life.
I am not going to assess the merits of the Good Samaritan Thesis or Justified Homicide Thesis. My concern is instead with personhood-bypassing challenges of the second kind, and with one notable example in particular. As I said, challenges of the second kind do not proceed by way of claiming that, in the final analysis, the permissibility of abortion does not depend upon whether the fetus is a person or not.
They have an altogether different character, asserting that the personhood question is a fundamentally misconceived starting point for philosophical discussion and, or, legal reasoning about abortion.
Perhaps the most prevalent example of this sort of argument in modern moral philosophy is Ronald Dworkin's intriguing retelling of the abortion debate in 2 Both exceptions are, naturally, subject to proportionality requirements. Actions taken in self defence must be not only necessary to resist the harm threatened by another person but also proportionate to that harm (one may not kill in self defence to avoid sustaining a minor injury). Homicides performed out of necessity are also subject to the proportionality requirement that more of value-namely, human life-is preserved by the killing than is lost by it (and even then, philosophers heavily dispute which side-constraints on necessity killing still apply). I will not be exploring these problems here, but it ought to be acknowledged that, in order to be convincing, the justified homicide thesis would need to show that abortion meets these conditions. his 1993 book Life's Dominion. 3 There, Dworkin offered a compelling revision of the abortion problem, which centrally claimed that the traditional debate about prenatal personhood is really only a proxy for an essentially distinct, and more religious-like, kind of conflict about the intrinsic value of human life. Far from being about whether or not the human fetus is truly a person in the philosophical sense, Dworkin argued that the real dispute over abortion revolves around different understandings of human life's intrinsic value, and whether or not abortion insults that value.
Moreover, he argued, failing to correctly diagnose the true nature of the conflict is also liable to induce a second mistaken belief: that abortion disagreement is politically intractable and resistant to principled compromise. Whereas the personhood-centered view of abortion argument leaves, as Dworkin saw it, little scope for principled resolution, once we are only able to understand what abortion argument is really about, a route to principled legal resolution within the context of continuing moral disagreement opens up by means of the doctrine of religious toleration. Dworkin's account thus, as he put it, 'contradicts the pessimistic conclusion that argument is irrelevant and accommodation impossible' which seems so plainly to follow from the traditional view of the debate. 4 Dworkin's thesis is clearly set apart from other personhood-bypassing accounts of the abortion problem like GST or JHT, and in a way which gives it a certain argumentative priority over them. If he was correct to hypothesise that 3 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA (1993) . 6 prenatal personhood is not, in any event, the crux of abortion disagreement, there will be little need to evaluate the other theses I outlined above, both of which set out to show that, despite appearances, whether the fetus is a person does not matter for our analysis of abortion. Consequently, there is good reason to attend to a thesis such as Dworkin's right at the outset of any fresh examination of the rights and wrongs of abortion -at the beginning of the beginning, if you like.
If correct, Dworkin's main claims about abortion argument might also point toward a more profitable pedagogy when engaging in abortion discussion. If, as he surmised, those who believe that the rights and wrongs of abortion turn on prenatal personhood are, in truth, debating something of a wholly different order, then
showing those discussants what an acceptable resolution could look like is less a matter of refuting those personhood-centred claims as it is getting them to appreciate their real reasons for making them. Lawyers and constitutional scholars in particular have no doubt found themselves drawn to the promise Dworkin held out for directing legal reasoning about abortion away from the intractable question of what constitutes personhood and into the more familiar territory of religious disagreement and toleration.
Be that as it may, in what follows I set out to show that Dworkin did not manage to displace the philosophical or legal primacy of the personhood issue in abortion argument. In particular, the main putative pay-off of Dworkin's thesisthat a principled political answer can be reached without positing an answer to the personhood question-is not forthcoming. I also contest Dworkin's descriptive claim that prenatal personhood is not, in truth, what contestants in the public abortion 7 debate are disputing. My argument for this draws partly from the ascertainable ways in which the shape of that public disagreement has developed since Dworkin made his novel claim and from asking whether those developments bolster or undermine it.
Lastly, although I hold Dworkin's view of the abortion problem to be incorrect, his argument in Life's Dominion is replete with important and instructive insights for anyone approaching abortion from a moral or legal perspective. In the course of underscoring the core weaknesses of Dworkin's contentions, I hope to bring into sharper focus the valuable contributions his thesis makes to abortion argument, which should continue to enrich and direct our reasoning about this perennially (and, even, increasingly) thorny issue.
II. THE RED HERRING
Before tracing the detail of Dworkin's account, it is important to clarify the meaning of 'person' in the context of this discussion, especially in relation to the separate descriptor 'human being'. Most moral philosophers distinguish between the classifications 'person' and 'human being', and Dworkin follows convention in this respect. 5 The ascription 'human being' is a biological categorisation, capturing to any living creature that is genetically a member of the human species. Any human fetus, or, for that matter, newly formed zygote, is at least a human being in the bare sense that it is a form of human life. It is definitely not a frog, or a cat.
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The ascription 'person', on the other hand, refers to those beings which possess a certain kind of moral status, typically elaborated in terms of interests or rights, and yielding a cluster of normative implications concerning how it is morally acceptable to treat such beings. Precisely what all of these normative implications are is a matter of some dispute. At the very least, however, personhood status is taken to entail strict rules about the permissibility of killing creatures in possession of that status. It is never permissible to kill persons, no matter how painlessly, for reasons of convenience or (on most views) even to promote an appreciable level of welfare among other creatures or persons. The same is not generally believed to be true of non-persons.
The analytical distinctness of human beings and persons is apparent from the fact that we can at least conceive of non-human persons: intelligent aliens, angels, perhaps even some non-human animals, can fit our concept of a person without being biologically human. So 'human being' and 'person' do not mean the same thing.
It may be true, nevertheless, that all human beings are, necessarily, persons. This would be so if all members of the human species also happened to meet the conditions for personhood, making overlap between the categories one hundred per cent. The analytical separateness of the categories simply means that it is an openand hence, an intelligible-question whether or not this is so.
Embracing this distinction, Dworkin addressed himself to the question whether disagreement about the personhood of the fetus is at the centre of conflict over abortion. In essence, he argued that the personhood issue is little more than a 9 red herring in abortion argument, failing to capture the real nature of the conflict, a conflict which he described in the following way:
Opposing armies march down the streets or pack themselves into protests at abortion clinics, court houses, and the White House, screaming at and spitting on and loathing one another. Abortion is tearing America apart. 6 Argument about abortion is, Dworkin observed, both 'fiercer and politically more important' than any other public battle, including that over euthanasia. 7 Moreover, when conducted in the traditional terms of argument about prenatal personhood, that conflict also appears to be entirely intractable. This impasse owes substantially to the fact that, as Dworkin says, 'neither side can offer any argument that the other must accept', since different conclusions about the personhood of the fetus are only, ultimately, a matter of 'primitive conviction' 8 . As he wrote:
[T]here is no biological fact waiting to be discovered or crushing moral analogy waiting to be invented that can dispose of the matter. It is a question of primitive conviction, and the most we can ask of each side is not understanding of the other, or even respect, but just a pale civility, the kind of civility one might show an incomprehensible but dangerous Martian. On Dworkin's view, those who see the fetus as equivalent to an unborn child from conception and those who view it as no more than a cluster of cells cannot hope 6 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 10.
7 Ibid at 4.
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to persuade each other otherwise by recourse to reason, for their beliefs are not grounded in reasoned argument to begin with, but only in basic intuition.
Fundamentally, either we see the fetus as a person or we do not. Neither can discussants who give different answers to the personhood question be expected to harbour much sympathy for the political goals of their antagonists. Those for whom the fetus is metaphysically analogous to a born human being will not be moved by women's rights arguments which, on their view, are blind to the fact that if a fetus is a helpless unborn child 'then permitting abortion is permitting murder, and having an abortion is worse than abandoning an inconvenient infant to die'. 9 Conversely, those who conceive of a fetus as something hardly different from a body part cannot help viewing the opponents of legal abortion as 'either acting in deep error' or out of bigotry, unreflective religiosity, or vindictiveness towards those whom they regard as fallen women.
As well as lacking any comprehension of or sympathy for one another's positions, Dworkin believed that contestants in the abortion debate conflicted over the question of prenatal personhood have no hope of reaching any principled compromise, for their convictions do not permit that. Those who believe that that the human fetus is a full-fledged person cannot accept legal abortion on the basis of its democratic pedigree any more than dissidents of a genocidal state can accept its atrocities as the will of the masses. On the other hand, those who regard the notion of prenatal personhood as positively laughable cannot be expected to coolly accept the legal prohibition or restriction of abortion, with all of its profound negative 9 ibid 9-10.
implications for the lives of women, merely because enough of the population believe in a ludicrous proposition. And so Dworkin concludes:
Self-respecting people who give opposite answers to whether the fetus is a person can no more compromise, or agree to live together allowing others to make their own decisions, than people can compromise about slavery or apartheid or rape… If the disagreement really is that stark, there can be no principled compromise but at best only a sullen and fragile standoff, defined by brute political power. 10 But Dworkin did not believe we should resign ourselves to this gloomy prognosis. This is because entire personhood-centered picture of the abortion conflict was, to his mind, based on a serious 'intellectual confusion'. 11 A good indication that the real nub of that disagreement is something other than as first appears comes in the way of what Dworkin called 'signal inconsistencies' in attitudes to abortion on both sides of the divide. Opponents of abortion rights, for instance, commonly make concessions where abortion is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman, or where pregnancy is the result of incest or rape.
Furthermore, many are willing to allow that, although abortion is immoral, it should nevertheless be legally permitted, that it ought not to invoke the same penalties as murder, or that despite their moral objection, they would support their own wife, daughter, or friend if she decided to obtain one.
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Some 'signal inconsistencies' echo on the "pro-choice" side too. While supporters of abortion rights clearly do not regard abortion as murder, they do frequently characterise it as a kind of a 'cosmic shame', and a 'grave moral decision', not to be undertaken lightly or for trivial reasons, for example because the pregnancy will interfere with a booked holiday. Consequently, they often support some legal restrictions on abortion choice, notwithstanding their beliefs that the fetus is not a person in the philosophical sense. No one can consistently hold that a fetus has a right not to be killed and at the same time hold it wrong for the government to protect that right by the criminal law. The most basic responsibility of government, after all, is to 12 ibid 14.
protect the interests of everyone in the community, particularly the interests of those who cannot protect themselves. 13 However, Dworkin argued, the signal inconsistencies are explicable once the conflict is recast in a different light. Central to a better understanding of abortion disagreement, he claimed, is a distinction between two very different grounds of But 'protecting fetal life' can implicate a very different ground of abortion opposition. Dworkin labelled this the detached objection to abortion, because it does not depend on ascribing any rights or interests to the individual fetus. The detached objection claims that all human life has a sacred or, in secular terms, intrinsic value, like the value we might ascribe to a brilliant work of art or find in natural beauty.
The objection claims that abortion is wrong not because it violates a fetus's right to life, but because it 'disregards or insults' that intrinsic value. 14 The detached objection differs critically from the derivative one in that it does not rely in any way on the claim that a fetus is a person or has rights and interests of its own. Nevertheless, Dworkin argued, someone who does not regard the fetus as a 13 ibid at 14.
14 person may still 'object to abortion just as strenuously as someone who insists it is' if his objection is rooted in detached grounds. 15 Just as someone might object to turning off the life-support of a patient with an incurable and intolerable illness not because of the belief that death is against her interests, but because the act of killing insults the intrinsic value of human life, so too might a person object to abortion not because she regards the fetus as having an interest in continued life, but because she views the extinguishing of any human life as an unacceptable affront to life's intrinsic value.
Dworkin believed that almost everyone who objects to abortion practice truly objects to it, 'as they might realise after reflection', on the detached rather than the derivative ground. 16 In other words, the ground of their objection is not their belief in the personhood of the fetus, even if they take it to be thus, but rather their commitment to the more impersonal, intrinsic value of human life, similar in its nature to the value we attribute to beautiful works of art or to endangered animal species whose preservation we take to be a good in itself. Once we understand this, Dworkin claims we can make far better sense of why some people think that abortion is wrong but ought to remain legal, while others think it acceptable, but legitimately regulated. It is perfectly 'consistent', he says, for someone who objects to abortion on detached grounds to hold that it is 'intrinsically wrong' to end a human life, but that the decision whether or not to end that life in utero must be left to the pregnant woman. 17 15 ibid 12.
16 ibid 13.
17 ibid 15.
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that the intrinsic value of human life is always insulted when abortion is carried out.
But not everyone will agree that premature death in the womb is the most serious frustration of human life. 19 Others may believe that performing an abortion is consistent with human life's intrinsic value if it prevents significant human creative investment in the life of the pregnant woman from being squandered. Disagreement about abortion is, in short, disagreement about which 'mode' of life's intrinsic value has the greater moral importance. While conservatives in the abortion debate are likely to think that natural investment in the form of biological life is pre-eminent, liberals more frequently believe that it is a bigger frustration of life's miracle when an adult human being's expectations are disappointed and talents wasted than when a fetus dies before any comparable investment in its life is made. 20 From all of this, Dworkin draws his significant conclusion about political resolution of the abortion question. Crucially, he argues that disagreement about the meaning and nature of life's intrinsic value has a 'quasi-religious' quality. Our personal interpretations of that value are, he says, 'essentially religious beliefs', relating, as they do, to questions about the meaning of life and death. The end picture is therefore of a conflict which is 'at bottom spiritual'. 21 But recognising the religious nature of abortion argument has important implications for the possibility of principled compromise. For, once the conflict is translated into these terms-into a matter of religious-like difference-a pathway to principled resolution is laid out by the doctrine of religious toleration. As Dworkin remarked, 'We think that it is a terrible form of tyranny, destructive of moral responsibility, for the community to impose tenets of spiritual faith or conviction on individuals.' 22 In modern pluralistic democracies, the protection of free exercise of religion therefore undergirds a permissive answer to the question of abortion's legality. Since everyone must be free to express her religious beliefs, for or against abortion, the state cannot coercively remove the abortion option. This is a conclusion which, Dworkin suggests, all those morally opposed to abortion have reason to accept if they are committed to religious toleration. constitutional power to dictate the intrinsic values which their citizens must respect and how they must respect them. In short, can a state 'impose the majority's conception of the sacred on everyone '? 24 This account, Dworkin argues, accords far better with the central legal question in Roe v Wade and the basis of scholarly objection to it. As was made evident in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, it was never conceivable that the Roe court could have declared the fetus a person for the purposes of constitutional protection -or so Dworkin claims. Since all good constitutional lawyers presumably appreciate this, he suggests that the real ground of lawyerly objection to Roe must concern some other part of the ruling, as the wealth of critical focus on the issue of state autonomy over abortion law would suggest. Unlike the personhood issue, the question if and when a government can coerce respect for an intrinsic value, and determine the form that respect must take, is an altogether more complex constitutional question about which we should anticipate serious scholarly disagreement.
III. 'SIGNAL INCONSISTENCIES' AND THE DESCRITPIVE CLAIM
As we have seen, a key aspect of Dworkin's account is the descriptive claim that prenatal personhood is not, in actual fact, at the root of public controversy over abortion-that it is not what people are arguing about-and that the features of that controversy can be better explained when adopting the 'detached' account of abortion's contestedness. It is with this claim that I wish to start. Scrutinizing it involves asking firstly, whether there is anything about public abortion conflict which stands in need of a special explanation (such as that people are mistaken about 24 Ibid 159. the grounds of their disagreement), and, secondly, whether that explanation cannot be found within the derivative account.
One of Dworkin's main arguments, we saw, was that 'signal inconsistencies' on both sides of the abortion divide are simply a bad fit with the derivative account which casts abortion disagreement as disagreement about prenatal personhood. He did not reach far, however, for alternative explanations of those putative inconsistencies that are more in keeping with a personhood-centred view of abortion conflict, despite the fact that some present themselves. In truth, we should not be at all surprised to find that many people hold ambivalent and even somewhat contradictory views on such a philosophically complex, politicised and emotively charged subject as abortion. Such inconsistencies, which are not special to abortion argument, could owe to any number of things. In the first place, the holders of those views may simply have not thought through their position with much analytical rigour, sheer lack of reflectiveness being, presumably, the most common source of argumentative incoherence. Alternatively, disputants may be led to embrace inconsistent concessions because of emotional or psychological biases, fear of social reproach, or even the need to disingenuously advocate compromise positions for politically strategic reasons.
Of all these possible explanations, strategic necessity strikes one as the most plausible reason why political opponents and supporters of abortion rights often make concessions which look like signal inconsistencies. Ideological opponents of abortion may support exceptions in cases of rape, incest, or grave risk to the pregnant woman's life for a host of pragmatic reasons: to avoid ostracising moderates; to focus firepower on the more winnable battles, and so on. If the strategic explanation were correct, we might well expect to see those opponents withdrawing the traditional concessions as and when political climates change and platforms can be radicalised without risking too much of the overall objective: to preserve as much fetal life as possible. The "ironing out" of some signal inconsistencies might be observable from the introduction of new state laws criminalising negligent pregnant behaviour (such as drug taking) which results in harm to or death of the fetus. 25 The putative inconsistency here is the lack of willingness to subject such women to the same consequences in law they would face for negligently harming their born children. If the fetus is just the same as a child, why should the criminal consequences of causing it harm differ? The more, then, that fetal harm laws are brought into line with laws prohibiting child abuse, , the more this 'inconsistency' begins to look merely like an inauthentic concession of long-standing by opponents of abortion.
Moreover, the derivative account explains perfectly well why ideologically inauthentic concessions such as rape or risk-to-life exceptions could be easily helpless child, any strategy which promises to gain the most ground in the wider political battle looks rationally defensible, even if it involves advocating disingenuous compromise positions. Theoretical consistency does not count for much when weighed against the value of preventing as much infanticide as possible.
Hence, anti-abortion protest which seeks to direct a special degree of moral opprobrium at late abortion will be intelligible on the derivative account if there is any reason to think that it presents the best shot at preventing some fetal deaths (say, because it is easier to mobilise general opposition to late abortion than to early abortion), even if contradicts the protesters' true convictions that all abortion is tantamount to homicide.
On the other side of things, ostensible inconsistencies demonstrated by defenders of abortion rights might equally be explained by a political need to make concessions. Abortion rights campaigners often admit that abortion is always sad or a shame, even when justified. Although this admission does not chime well with the extremely low moral status they accord to the fetus (if nothing of significant moral standing is lost, why such a shame?), it can help to placate moderate sensibilities.
As well as being tenable, mundane explanations like these are perfectly consistent with the pre-eminence of prenatal personhood in abortion disagreement.
Rather than offering the explanation that what disputants in the abortion debate say they believe about fetal personhood does not reflect their true beliefs, this explanation suggests that the attitudes which demonstrate signal inconsistencies are themselves inauthentic.
Aside from scepticism about whether the signal inconsistencies really run deep, it might be thought that Dworkin's appeal to them as evidence that disputants are not really arguing about fetal personhood also relies on a claim that we should hesitate to accept: that no one could be seriously be engaged in a particular theoretical dispute unless his position in that dispute were coherent through and through. Frances Kamm labelled this the 'No Wrong Belief View', that is, the view that no one engaged in abortion debate could hold an inconsistent belief, and, hence, that nothing about the moves in that debate could be explained by sheer inconsistency. 26 As Kamm argued, there is no basis whatsoever for Dworkin maintaining the complete coherence of public attitudes as a premise in his investigations. By ruling out the possibility that disputants could simply be inconsistent on some points, it seems that Dworkin was jumping too quickly to the conclusion that abortion disagreement must be about something else. explanations for some inconsistent positions, Dworkin gave them an unreasonable amount of credence as evidence against the derivative account.
I have suggested that Dworkin may have been wrong to take 'signal inconsistencies' at face value. However, inasmuch as the dichotomous attitudes he was describing are genuinely held by protagonists in the abortion debate, one might even question whether they are necessarily inconsistent with the derivative account.
Take, for instance, those abortion protestors who do not, in all respects, seem to equate abortion with murder. One reason they may fail to do so is not because they equivocate about fetal personhood, but because they entertain the possibility (consciously or not) that abortion is an instance of justified homicide, or amounts to the mere failure to be a Good Samaritan. Uncertainty about those questions-in other words, about JHT and GST-is entirely consistent with the belief that the fetus has the same interest in continued life as all born human beings. (As we saw at the beginning, JHT and GST only really become relevant once fetal personhood is presumed).
Someone who regards abortion as something other than murder for either of these reasons would continue to regard it as extremely morally grave and regrettable -something to be avoided as much as possible, as is true of justified killing in self-defence. Still, even on this picture, fetal personhood remains squarely at the centre of abortion disagreement. For, whether they equate abortion with murder or not, the moral and legal issue with abortion comes, for the abortion opponent, from the fact that the death of the fetus is tantamount to the death of a person. It is only this belief which renders abortion so morally problematic for the protestor -the kind of act which only stops short of being murder if GST or JHT were true. In sum, then, there may be little about the public abortion conflict that is left inexplicable on the derivative account. But for what it is worth, the derivative account also commands its own fair share of explanatory power, and in some respects outperforms the detached account in this regard. Dworkin duly notes that the abortion conflict is uniquely ferocious as compared with practically all other public disagreements. But this feature accords far better with the derivative than with the detached version of the controversy. The escalation to violence, which has punctuated that conflict at times (and again recently) is certainly more explicable when opposition to abortion is understood in terms of the derivative claim that abortion unjustly kills a human child. As a response to the belief that abortion murders children, the shooting of abortionists is at least intelligible, if not justified.
Somewhat less so when it is understood as the expression of just one interpretation of the intrinsic value of human life.
Of course, the content of anti-abortion rhetoric has long been of the kind which lends a good deal of support to the derivative view of abortion opposition.
Verbal and pictorial protest messages invoke the language and imagery of murder, both implicitly and explicitly drawing a metaphysical equivalence between fetuses and babies. Anticipating this evidence in favour of the derivative view, Dworkin countered that opponents of abortion in fact only employ the rhetoric of murder in order to emphasise their objection based on the sanctity of human life. 27 Talk of murdering babies simply packs more punch than spiritualistic rhetoric about life's sacred value, although the real basis for opposition was always the latter, he argued.
Dworkin's retort has some initial plausibility. But the idea that the anti-abortion movement's assimilation of abortion with murder is empty rhetoric is increasingly 27 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 20-21. On page 21, he says: "They declare that abortion is murder, or just as bad as murder, and they insist that human life begins at conception, or that a fetus is a person from the beginning, not because they think a fetus has rights and interests but just to emphasise the depth of their feeling that abortion is wrong because it is the deliberate destruction of the life of a human proposition that 'fetal pain' is experienced during abortion, 30 and, most recently, mandatory pre-abortion ultrasound scanning and information laws (dubbed, 'women's right to know' laws), which seek to dissuade women out of abortion choice by requiring medical staff to show them, and, or, describe to them, a sonogram image of their fetus. 31 Legislative moves such as these draw heavily on the prenatal personhood narrative, either being rationalised by, or attempting to facilitate revelation of, the fact that the fetus has interests similar or equal to that of born human beings. Rev. 351 (2008) . Some states require the provider to show and describe the image; others provide that she may decline to see or look away, though her decision to do so must be recorded. The Texas version of the law requires the practitioner to make the fetus's heart beat audible to the pregnant woman.
All of this renders the derivative view quite difficult to resist. To be sure, Dworkin may well have responded by insisting that these are yet more red herrings, indicating at most that opponents of abortion are rhetorically committed to the narrative of prenatal personhood, not that they are truly, deeply committed to it. But the wisdom of Occam's Razor should prompt us to reject his alternative explanations in the absence of a clear need for them. Dworkin believed that the rhetoric and ferociousness of the abortion conflict is explained by the fact that disputants are conflicted over an essentially spiritual issue, whilst being mistaken about the true grounds of their disagreement. The far simpler and more obvious explanation is that one side in the conflict really does believe that murder is at stake, while the other side believes the idea so preposterous that bigotry and oppression is all that they can see as left to be marshalled against them.
Lastly, if today's opponents of abortion really are mistaken about their grounds of opposition, then it seems they are quite deeply and irreversibly mistaken.
And if the mistake is indeed so deeply entrenched, one may even wonder how worthwhile it is to attempt to reconceive their entire argument for them, rather than to address that objection on its own terms. This pedagogical point also leads on to a
further question about what space Dworkin thinks exists between vehemently believing one's grounds of opposition to a practice are X and one's grounds actually being X. It may be true that, in one way, moral thinking is less the process of changing one's mind as it is discovering what, upon reflection, one already believed to be true. But this is no truer of our beliefs about the moral status of the fetus as it is about anything else. If critics of abortion are firmly enough convinced that their objection lies in the fact that the human fetus is as much a person as the typical, adult human being, and that abortion and murder are therefore of a piece, it may well be asked in what sense their 'actual' claims consist in something different.
IV. THE 'ANTI-PERSONHOOD' ARGUMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL

DISPUTE
Up to this point, I have been examining the proposition that prenatal personhood is not what public abortion argument is about. But one might well ask why, as philosophers or lawyers, we ought to be interested at all in the nature of public discourse, coherent, rigorous or otherwise. After all, the terms of that discourse do not necessarily bear any relation to the philosophically and legally pertinent issues in abortion. Why should it even matter?
It is clear that Dworkin's claims about the nature of abortion controversy are not meant to be mere descriptions of the public argument. That is, Dworkin was, very clearly, also making the stronger claim that prenatal personhood-or, the 'derivative' question-is not what is philosophically and legally salient in abortion.
One important argument for that claim comes in the way of his contention that no one could sensibly regard the fetus as a person with rights and interests of its own, 'in particular an interest in not being destroyed'-from the moment of its conception. 32 This is because the fetus has never possessed any mental life, something Dworkin sees as an essential pre-requisite of having such interests.
Comparing early fetuses to the assemblage of body parts on Dr. Dworkin's exposition of the tension between the claim that the fetus is owed constitutional personhood and that states ought to be left free to determine their own abortion laws is incisive for constitutional scholars. As between fetal constitutional personhood and state autonomy over abortion, it is, apparently, one or the other; state freedom to grant abortion rights cannot be tolerated if the fetus is a person. Still, it does not necessarily follow that Dworkin is correct about the main question for the constitutionality of abortion.
To start with, lawyers who disagree with Roe because they view the fetus so 
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of Roe based on the Supreme Court's misappropriation of state autonomy would still yield the desired result: the prohibition of abortion. And if, as those who hold the derivative objection believe, abortion unjustly kills persons, any effective legal argument against the constitutional right to a termination is presumably as good as any other.
Next, scholars objecting to Roe on state autonomy grounds need not embrace incoherence if they are also committed to the normative claim that, being a person (as they see it) in the moral sense, a fetus ought to have its personhood recognised by the Constitution. A legal case in favour of states retaining autonomy to permit or prohibit abortion as they see fit could begin by granting, for the sake of argument,
Roe's conclusion on the personhood issue. In other words, a lawyer might argue that once it is accepted that the fetus lacks constitutional status, the correct legal conclusion is that states should be free to determine their own abortion laws.
Correct or not, there is nothing inconsistent about this position, which in no way commits its proponents to endorsing the Roe majority's refusal to extend constitutional personhood to the fetus.
This said, a considerable amount of contemporary objection to Roe does explicitly target its ruling on fetal personhood, as the 'personhood amendment' movement demonstrates. 40 This brings us to Dworkin's stronger claim that the fetus's personhood status is simply not constitutionally salient. As seen, this claim 40 The adoption of a constitutional amendment to grant the fetus personhood status under the 14 th Amendment is currently a core tenet of the Republican National Committee's platform on abortion.
See, https://www.gop.com/platform/we-the-people/.
rests in what Dworkin perceives as the undeniability of Roe's conclusion on fetal personhood as a question of law. Since there was no precedent for recognising the fetus as a subject of protection under the 14 th Amendment, Dworkin argued that a contrary ruling would have been legally unsupportable. He did, however, acknowledge the fact that the Supreme Court has been known to upend conventional understandings of the Constitution on questions as fundamental as this -citing 
Brown v Topeka Board of Education
V. INTRACTABILITY AND PRINCIPLED COMPROMISE
As was seen, Dworkin believed that if the derivative view of abortion conflict is correct, then that conflict is inherently intractable and resistant to principled compromise. Misunderstanding the real root of the disagreement therefore has serious consequences for resolving abortion politically. 45 This point can be reinforced merely by considering the multitude of hypothetical revelations about the fetus which would not obviously end argument about whether it meets the conditions for personhood. We might suppose it is discovered that the human fetus of a certain gestational age remembers things, feels pain, and has rudimentary desires. There will still be those who claim that independent biological existence is a necessary condition for personhood. Likewise, we could image scientists assuring us that a fetus possesses no conscious life whatsoever, no matter how rudimentary, before birth. For many, this will make no difference to the fetus's personhood status, which owes to its membership in the human species, not any exercisable psychological capacity. There is, I think, no plain fact about the fetus which would end argument about prenatal personhood one way or the other. This is, of course, entirely what we should expect of a dispute which is fundamentally moral (having to do with the value that ought to be ascribed to creatures possessing this or that quality) and not scientific.
intractability is precisely what one would expect. It is strange if Dworkin imagined that a conflict rooted in religious-like commitments would foster more reasoned exchanges, or be any more philosophically soluble, than argument about the conditions for personhood. 46 At the same time, if intractability really were a feature only of the derivative question, then the continuation of profound disagreement would count as good evidence for the derivative account.
It is not at all clear, then, that of the two kinds of disagreement, the derivative one is uniquely philosophically intractable. One might also think there is some measure of tension between Dworkin's claims that the derivative question is not amenable to reasoned argument and his own reasoned argument against fetal personhood, based on their lack of mental states and, hence, interests. Let us put these complaints to one side, however, and consider Dworkin's main argument about the political resolution of the abortion dispute. This is that if he is correct that abortion disagreement is 'essentially religious' disagreement, as the detached account suggests, a settled constitutional basis for compromise is provided by the doctrine of religious freedom. In practical terms, he argued, this means that a permissive stance on abortion practice is constitutionally required. The First Amendment right to free exercise of religion protects the equal right of all citizens to follow their convictions on 'profoundly spiritual matters', with the result that states may not impose an official line on the abortion question. 47 This constitutional 46 Perhaps all moral questions are intractable past a point -the point at which their answer depends on far more deep-seated philosophical commitments, argument about which is bound to be interminable.
40
basis for the abortion right is, he argued, one which all those committed to the free exercise of religion have a reason to accept, even if they continue to disagree, 'religiously', about the morality of abortion.
Some will no doubt quibble with Dworkin's suggestion that abortion beliefs can be assimilated into essentially religious ones. 48 But let us assume that he is right about that. The next question is whether it follows, as Dworkin seems to believe, that the derivative issue is not pertinent to the constitutionality of abortion. Dworkin is wrong, therefore, if he believes that applying the doctrine of religious toleration to abortion does not rest on derivative grounds, or presuppose them. If the fetus were a person, as one side of the abortion debate insists, the right to abortion could not be defended using the religious freedoms of those that take the opposite view, for the doctrine of religious toleration does not protect homicide. 
VI. ARGUING ABOUT PERSONHOOD
But what if the notion of fetal personhood really does strike one, as it did Dworkin, as 'scarcely intelligible'? In the eyes of some, the assignation of personhood to fetuses is wrong not merely in that it is a miscalculation-because it is, in the end, false. It is wrong for being conceptually incoherent. On this thinking, our shared concept of a person can no more admit human fetuses within its boundaries than it can admit rocks or trees or insects. To be sure, someone might protest that a rock, a tree or an insect is in fact a person, and that we have always been mistaken in thinking otherwise. To such a protest, there may be little to say except that the person making it does not grasp the concept of a person if she is willing to make such claims. If anything is true about persons, it is that a rock cannot be one full status, as persons, the denial has been a terrible moral atrocity. If we are right to take this attitude with fetuses, it will be the first and only time.
These might all be fielded as tentative reasons for taking the suggestion of fetal personhood more seriously than the notion that rocks or trees or insects might be persons. Moreover, this shadow of a doubt clearly looms larger at the margins of gestation and birth, where the physiological differences between the fetus and personhood-possessing neonates are much reduced. 50 And insofar as there is reason to take seriously the proposition that fetuses could be persons, the hypothetical implications of an affirmative answer make it the first port of call in a serious discussion about abortion.
What, though, if the signal inconsistencies Dworkin illuminated hold independent rational appeal for us? What is someone to make of the derivative question if she finds merit in the notion that having an abortion is not just like cutting one's hair or having a tonsillectomy, whilst being, nonetheless, a far cry from murder? For Dworkin, as we have seen, these cross-cutting judgements could only go to show that arguing about abortion by way of debating prenatal personhood is a fruitless. But perhaps he was too hasty in ruling out the possibility that a richer conception of personhood will somehow account for intuitions such as these. Where 50 I do not mean to assume here that neonates possess philosophical personhood whereas late-term fetuses do not, or that birth is morally significant for personhood status -questions about which there has been a good deal of writing. My point is only that the typical assignation of personhood to neonates gives reason to seriously examine the moral status of late fetuses, which closely resemble neonates in physiological development (although there are also marked physiological differences) and are closely biologically continuous with them. neonates can surely form part of a potentially persuasive argument. Whether they are ultimately winning or not, these are reasoned forms of engagement that seek to change minds by drawing on discussants' own judgements and distinctions, and attempting to reveal inconsistencies within them (the standard methodology of moral philosophy).
Still, if fetal personhood really is the touchstone of abortion disagreement, the question might linger as to why contestants in the abortion debate do not explicitly engage one another even more on that front than they already do. As I suggested earlier, discussants' motivations for framing their position as they do may be multifarious, but one compelling explanation for the lack of a developed public dialogue about the personhood question is that defenders of abortion rights in particular often fail to make their denial of fetal personhood explicit, or fully appreciate its importance in the wider debate. Failure to foreground this important premise might be due to more than one thing: a belief that the fetus's sub-person status is so self-evident as to not warrant pointing out, or the inability to see any way of arguing for it that does not rely on its self-evidentiary quality. Either way, the result is a failure to meet the core tenet of abortion opposition head-on. Mary
Anne Warren stated the problem this way:
Because pro-abortionists have never adequately come to grips with the conceptual issues surrounding abortion, most if not all if the arguments they advance in opposition to laws restricting access to abortion fail to refute or even weaken the traditional antiabortion argument, i.e. that a fetus is a human being [in the "moral sense"], and therefore abortion is murder. 51 Nor did Warren think that supporters of abortion rights should settle for a legal answer which views the terminating act as, albeit justified, 'comparable to killing in self defence', when the basis of their own conviction is, quite differently, 
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